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Abstract 
Once in a few years, we witness a new ostan (province) being born out of older ostans 
in Iran. The number of shahrestans has gone from 316 in 2003 to 429 in 2013. There 
seems to be an everlasting desire for lower levels of administrative areas to separate 
and form a new higher level area. Shahrestans want to become ostans, and bakhshs 
want to become shahrestans. This paper studies the economic effects of becoming a 
new ostan by looking at the consumption of households. Results show a significant 
positive effect on the growth of consumption in the separation year or the following 
year. Becoming the central Shahrestan of the new Ostan does not show positive effects 
on consumption growth.  
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1. Introduction 
Iran is a large country with the land area of 1,648,195 km2, ranking 17th in the world and second 
in the Middle East. With a large presence in the economic life of its more than 81 million people, 
  
the government needs to manage its routine procedures in different administrative area levels. The 
current administrative division system is based on a law passed at 1937 (Rezvani, 2015, pp. 95-
98) that has not been changed in levels, but the number of areas in each level has increased. The 
first administrative area level is called Ostan (province). Iran has 31 Ostans since 2010 (1389 in 
Persian Calendar) compared to 24 Ostans in 1979.1 Each Ostan is comprised of a few Shahrestans 
(counties). Shahrestan is the second level of administrative areas in Iran and although there were 
165 Shahrestans in Iran in 1979, in 2013 there are 429 Shahrestans. The third level is called 
Bakhsh. Each Bakhsh has one Shahr (city/town/urban area) or more, and a few Dehestans (rural 
areas). Each Dehestan controls several Roostas (villages). As the number of Ostans and 
Shahrestans suggests, there has always been an ongoing modification of administrative areas that 
was almost always in the road to separate and create more areas. Any large Roosta tries to be 
recognized as a Shahr, and promote its Dehestan to a new Bakhsh. Any large Dehestan wants to 
be a Bakhsh for itself and control surrounding Dehestans. For areas with higher levels, it gets 
harder to separate and form a new higher level area, but still, there are several large Bakhshs 
fighting for their right to be a Shahrestan, and more populous Shahrestans try to form new Ostans.  
The ongoing process of creating new administrative areas can be explained by two main 
motivations. The first is the motivation of bureaucrats in the pursuit of power. Mueller (2003, p. 
362) denotes that as the pursuit of profits is not the perceived legitimate goal of public bureaus, it 
is difficult for public bureaucrats to convert the power they have into income even more in 
comparison to private sector managers. A large literature in management show that managers 
facing this problem pursue numerous substitute goals including excess staff (Williamson, 1964). 
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 For a brief review on the history of administrative divisions in Iran prior to the 1979 revolution, refer to 
Ghorbani (2013, p.2). 
  
Thus the nonmonetary goals of management especially the size of the staff and number of 
management levels and units under control become the logical objectives of the public bureaucrat 
(Mueller, 2003, p. 362). But the power-pursuing bureaucrats are not the only reason behind this 
process. It seems that people themselves support the idea of new administrative areas. The local 
visit of every president or member of the parliament is full of promises including the promise of 
promoting the area to a higher level. It should be a favorable promise to talk about. Rezvani (2015) 
mentions that the creation of Ardabil (the Ostan) was due to popular demand. There has been also 
a few local clashes over administrative division decisions. Rezvani (2015) attributes the 
administrative fragmentation in Iran to the centralized system of Iran and mentions that local elites 
in some localities try to elevate the administrative level of their locality in order to secure more 
economic means and facilities. The higher the level in the administrative-territorial hierarchy, the 
greater the extent of facilities and economic means. Holding the status of an Ostan is especially 
advantageous as it provides direct funding by Tehran (the capital). Rezvani (2015) describes the 
process of administrative area modifications as a process whereby an aspirant capital lobbies 
Tehran against the desires of the hosting Ostan’s capital in order to be liberated from the latter’s 
tutelage and hence receives its own budget. A third motivation of politicized ethnicity for 
ethnoterritorial conflicts and fragmentation is rejected by Rezvani (2015) on the basis of lack of 
ethnoterritorial federalism, the absence of politicized ethnicity and the civic nature of the Iranian 
nation.  
This paper studies the economic nature of this ongoing process of administrative area 
modifications by looking at the consumption of the households. The household microdata is 
utilized in the study, and different grouping strategies have been applied. The household level data 
include information on the Shahrestan of residence since 1998. The final Ostan divisions are rebuilt 
  
from the beginning using data on Shahrestans and their modifications and then different pseudo 
panels are created based on Ostans and cohorts. Also, the initial Shahrestan information is saved 
for each new Shahrestan and Shahrestan level panels are built. The econometric analysis consists 
of simple panel regression of real consumption growth on the dummy variable of new Ostan 
creation. Results confirm the economic benefit theory and show that the creation of a new Ostan 
has a significant positive effect on the consumption of its resident households.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews the data used in 
the study which is essentially the household expenditures and income surveys data, consumer price 
index data and administrative areas modification data. The model and results section follows data 
and shows the regression model used in the study and the results of regressions on different 
synthetic panels. A brief robustness check section follows and the last section is the conclusion. 
2. Data 
Household Expenditures and Income Surveys 
The main data source for this study are various years of Household Expenditures and Income 
Surveys (HEIS) microdata collected and published by the Statistical Center of Iran. The survey is 
nationally representative and two-stage stratified, at the urban and rural level and by province. The 
survey is weighted, and the sampling weights are provided by the SCI. This survey includes 
information on expenditures and incomes of urban and rural Iranian households (Mostafavi-
Dehzooei & Salehi-Isfahani, 2017). The surveys have been conducted since 19632, but only those 
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 The surveys are conducted based on Persian calendar years. So the 1998 survey (1377 survey) data relates to 
the time span from March 21, 1998 to March 20, 1999. Some authors denote this as 1998-99 data, but it is denoted as 
1998 data in this paper for simplicity.   
  
since 1984 are available in unit records (Salehi-Isfahani & Marku, 2011). The geographical 
information in Shahrestan level are only available since 1998. Therefore 20 years of data – 1998 
to 2017 – is used. Nondurable consumption is calculated excluding all durables and medical 
expenditures. Data for Shahrestans Abu Musa, Tabas, and Qaenat are omitted due to missing 
observations for a few years.  
Data on Prices 
To calculate real consumption one needs price data. More detailed the price data, more precise the 
calculated real values. The CPI data in Ostan level is used in this study. Total CPI index is available 
for all years in the study for all Ostans, but the 12 COICOP groups’ price indexes are available 
since 2004. For data since 2004, real consumption is calculated for each group then summed up.    
Administrative Division System Data 
The Statistical Center of Iran published some information on administrative division systems used 
in its surveys. The changes in Ostans and especially Shahrestans has been thoroughly studies using 
several sources including the Farmandari (local Shahrestan governer) to find the links. For each 
Shahrestan in each year the final Ostan code is saved. For example the Shahrestan Karaj which 
was once a member of Ostan Tehran, will end up as Ostan Alborz, thus the final Ostan of all data 
relating to Karaj in all years is set to be Alborz. On the other hand for all Shahrestans their initial 
Shahrestan is also saved. For example Shahrestan Nazarabad was once a part of Shahrestan 
Savojbolagh, so the initial Shahrestan for all Nazarabad records on all years is recorded as 
Savojbolagh. Therefore we can build panels based on latest Ostan divisions and olderst Shahrestan 
divisions. In the time span of the study 3 new Ostans have been created. South Khorasan and North 
Khorasan were established in 2004 and Alborz is established in 2011. Thus for these Ostans and 
years, the dummy variable for creation of new Ostan is set to 1. There is also another dummy 
  
defined for the central Shahrestan of these new Ostans for the establishment years. This dummy 
variable is set to 1 for Bojnourd and Birjand in 2004 and for Karaj in 2011. 
Building Synthetic Panels 
The data used is not a genuine panel data, where specific individuals or households are followed 
over time. While SCI has recently started to create a rolling panel schema for HEIS, the history is 
not that long and also households stay in the data at most for 3 years, and thus not useful for this 
study. HEIS data however, are available as repeated cross-sectional surveys that suffer much less 
from typical panel data limitations like attrition and non-response (Verbeek, 2008) and can be used 
to build synthetic panel data.  
The use of synthetic panels to estimate a fixed effects model from repeated cross-sectional 
data was first suggested by Deaton (1985). In this approach, individuals sharing common fixed 
characteristics (often the year of birth or region of residence) are grouped into cohorts, then 
averaged within these cohorts. These averages are treated as observations in a pseudo panel 
(Verbeek, 2008). Verbeek lists conditions on the grouping criteria. It is important to realize that 
the variables by which cohorts are defined should be observed for all individuals in the sample. 
Thus time-varying variables such as income cannot be used. Another condition is that the criteria 
should be an exogenous variable in the sense that it should be uncorrelated with the unobservable 
variables in the equation, yet appropriately correlated to the explanatory variable in the model. It 
means that cohorts are defined as groups whose explanatory variables change differently over time. 
Also large number of groups may lead to poor results as the cell size decreases (Verbeek, 2008). 
Different grouping strategies has been used in the literature. In a similar grouping practice 
to this paper, Chamon & Prasad (2010) consider cohorts based on five-year range for the year of 
  
birth of the household head interacted with province, and five-year range for the year of birth of 
the household head interacted with his or her education (six categories) and province. Two 
methods has been used in this paper to create synthetic panels. In the first method interaction of 
final Ostan and 10-year or 5-year ranges for the year of birth of the household head (Cohort10 and 
Cohort5) is used. In the second method initial Shahrestan is used. In the first method we follow 
Ostans through the time. Another way to study the mentioned problem is to follow Shahrestans 
through the time instead of the whole Ostans. As the number of Shahrestans is higher, using 
another grouping criteria along with the location such as birth cohorts can lead to really small cell 
sizes, thus in the Shahrestan Panel, no other grouping variable is used. The log of consumption is 
calculated in household level then averaged over each cell. 
Table 1 - Characteristics of the Synthetic Panels 
Panel Final Ostan / Cohort10 Final Ostan / Cohort 5 Initial Shahrestan 
Observations 4216 7934 19833 
Cross-sections 248 434 1238 
Years 20 20 20 
Median Cell Size 138 73 18 
Mean Cell Size 150 79 32 
 
3. Model and Results 
Panels of Final Ostans 
Two groups of models are estimated for each panel. The first group of models are regression of 
consumption growth on the lags of dummy variable of Ostan creation. The second group includes 
an additional lag of consumption growth.  Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑗3𝑗=0 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑗3𝑗=0 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (2) 
  
Where 𝑐 denotes the log of consumption and 𝐷 is the dummy variable indicating the creation of 
new Ostan.  
Table 1 shows the results of the panel fixed effect regressions on initial Ostan / cohort 10 
panel. Table 2 shows the results for initial Ostan / cohort 5 panel. Results show a positive 
significant effect of the first lag of dummy variable on the consumption growth. This means that 
following the year of creation, the residents of the new Ostan experience a higher consumption 
growth. As there is no significant negative effect later, this means that there is a level effect on the 
consumption of households. 
Table 2 - Effect of Creation of a New Ostan on it's Resident's Consumption Growth: Initial Ostan / Cohort 10 Panel Estimates 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.30***     
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)     𝐷𝑖,𝑡  -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1   0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***  0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2    0.01 0.01   -0.03 -0.04 
   (0.04) (0.04)   (0.04) (0.04) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3     0.02    0.02 
    (0.04)    (0.04) 
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03     
Num. obs. 3720 3720 3720 3472 3968 3968 3720 3472 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
There seems to be a negative significant effect on the year of the creation in some of estimations 
but the numerical absolute value of this effect is smaller than the positive effect on the next year, 
so the overall effect can be considered to be positive.  
  
Table 3 - Effect of Creation of a New Ostan on it's Resident's Consumption Growth: Initial Ostan / Cohort 5 Panel Estimates 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.32*** -0.32***     
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)     𝐷𝑖,𝑡  -0.06* -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.10** -0.09** -0.08* -0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1   0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14***  0.18*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 
 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2    0.03 0.02   -0.03 -0.03 
 
  (0.03) (0.03)   (0.03) (0.03) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−3     0.05    0.05 
    (0.03)    (0.03) 
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Adj. R2 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
Num. obs. 7064 7064 7064 6629 7499 7499 7064 6629 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
Panels of Initial Shahrestans 
The same type of regressions as the last section is used in this section. As the analysis is in the 
Shahrestan level the dummy of the capital Shahrestan of the created Ostan is also added. As 
mentioned in the data section this dummy variable is set to 1 for Bojnourd and Birjand in 2004 
and for Karaj in 2011.  Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑗2𝑗=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑗2𝑗=0 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑗2𝑗=0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑗2𝑗=0 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
Where 𝑐 denotes the log of consumption and 𝐷 is the dummy variable indicating the creation of 
new Ostan. 𝑋 is the dummy variable indicating the center Shahrestan of the newly created Ostan. 
  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 𝐷𝑖,𝑡  0.09 0.10 0.10    0.18* 0.18* 0.18* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)    (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1   0.09 0.09     0.07 0.07 
 
 (0.07) (0.07)     (0.09) (0.09) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2    -0.08      -0.14 
 
  (0.07)      (0.09) 𝑋𝑖,𝑡     -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 
 
   (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1      0.12 0.13  0.05 0.06 
 
    (0.11) (0.11)  (0.14) (0.14) 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2       0.02   0.16 
      (0.11)   (0.14) 
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adj. R2          
Num. obs. 4598 4598 4356 4598 4598 4356 4598 4598 4356 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
Statistical models 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Δ𝑐𝑖,𝑡−1  -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** -0.28*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡  0.13* 0.14* 0.14*    0.24** 0.25** 0.24** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
   
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1   0.12 0.12     0.13 0.12 
 
 
(0.07) (0.07) 
    
(0.08) (0.08) 𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2    -0.06      -0.12 
 
  
(0.07) 
     
(0.08) 𝑋𝑖,𝑡     -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.29* -0.29* -0.28* 
 
   
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1      0.11 0.12  -0.02 -0.01 
 
    
(0.11) (0.11) 
 
(0.13) (0.13) 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2       0.05   0.18 
 
     
(0.11) 
  
(0.13) 
R2 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 
Adj. R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Num. obs. 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 4356 
***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05 
 
  
Results show positive effect of creation of a new Ostan in the same year. The dummy variable for 
the center Shahrestan of the newly established Ostan does not have significant effect when studied 
alone. But in interaction with new Ostan dummy and the lag of the dependent variable it shows 
negative effect. This means that the center Shahrestan does not benefit from the separation. 
Although this conclusion is just based on three observations in a 4356 observations panel. 
4. Conclusion 
One motivation for separation of smaller administrative areas (e.g. Shahrestans) to form 
newly established higher administrative areas (eg. Ostans) is the economic factor. Residents of the 
Shahrestans that feel that all the budget is consumed in the capital Shahrestan want to separate 
from their original Ostan and form a new Ostan. This paper studies this theory in household data 
and finds out that this is indeed a rational perspective. If residents of Shahrestans argue that it is 
beneficial for them to separate, they seem to be right. There are positive effects of separation on 
their consumption growth, without any negative one in future years. That means the consumption 
of the households of separating Ostans experience a permanent shift in their consumption and thus 
welfare. Results support the economic motivation for separation but are silent on other 
explanations. Policy implication of the results is that the budgets should be spend evenly on all 
areas in the country not just Ostan capitals.  
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